Naval recruitment systems; supply and demand
124
IN THEE STAITS SERVIS
comprehensive analysis of the Nine Years' War gives 6% British, making them the
second largest foreign group aboard Zeeland warships after the Southern
Netherlands.25 New samples from other periods, however, in Figure 1 below indi
cate comparable or increased levels.
Figure 1: British personnel aboard Zeeland warships, 1643-170930
Sampled
British
British
1643-8
1829
323
17.7
1672
931
44
4.7
1700-9
2463
236
9.6
Though still relatively small, these samples suggest that British seamen maintained
both an appreciable and a continual presence during the period of study here -
and that the British estimates, although probably exaggerated and doubtless inac
curate, may not actually be that far from reality. How did these Britons come to
be in the Dutch navy?
Figure 1 above suggests that more British were in the Dutch fleet when the two
nations were not at war: probably national identity and patriotism were a braking
influence on the overall flow during wartime - other factors excepted, though
more data is clearly required. Conversely, the turmoil within the British conglom
erate state over this period augmented the British presence during the Dutch wars
by offering those with religious/ideological motivations opportunities to fight the
hated regime at home. After 1688, however, this prospect ended with the Anglo-
Dutch alliance. The Dutch Republic - the centre of world trade - was also already
home for whole communities of ex-patriate British seamen who were assimilated
to various degrees into the Dutch 'host' country. For many it was entirely natural
to join the navy of their adopted nation. The poor incidence of payment of wages
to Royal Navy crews was clearly an issue in 1667, but we shall see that other eco
nomic differentials in the field of pay formed 'push' factors away from British serv
ice and 'pull' factors towards that of the Dutch. In the bigger picture, British-
Dutch trade and naval recruitment systems play a considerable part.
The State had developed permanent navies - composed increasingly of purpose-
built warships instead of converted merchantmen, and the associated infrastruc
ture of dockyards and industry - but simply could not afford to retain the huge
amounts of naval seamen required for war during peacetime. Besides, there never
seemed to be enough men, and these were needed for trade in any case. Instead,
naval powers maintained small peacetime navies with the majority of the warships
laid up; when war seemed imminent, a desperate race ensued between belligerents
to get men into the navy from elsewhere in the maritime sector. Whoever com
pleted their crews first could get to sea first and seize the initiative. Manpower
fluctuations also took place during wartime: after the summer campaigning sea
son deployments and therefore manning levels were usually heavily reduced dur-
