IN THEE STAITS SERV1S
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'his Majesty's intentions for bringing seamen over did not comprehend those taken in mer
chant ships through their own carelessness in not taking or waiting for convoys but such
seamen as were lately and would be willing to be in his Majesty's service.'70
To make matters worse, during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, those returning sus
pected of having deserted from foreign service were automatically imprisoned
pending investigation: hardly an encouragement for these men to return.71 Given
the circumstances, we should not be surprised when, in 1667, Downing thought
that not even one out of every six prisoners of war released actually returned to
Britain.72
Naval wage levels and incidence of payment
Reflecting Dutch superior financial techniques and means, naval wage arrears in
the Republic were under more control than in Britain, usually running to months
rather than years at the peak of Dutch strength. Even the under-resourced Zeeland
admiralty compared with the larger and richer centres of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam - usually managed to both keep arrears to a minimum whilst provid
ing wartime wage increases and bounties.73 Failure to pay crews promptly enough
was courting mutiny aboard ship or riot ashore - seamen were very often prone to
disorder when ashore in any case. The Rotterdam admiralty was besieged on occa
sion by unpaid crews or their wives,74 whilst in Britain Cromwell himself was once
in danger of his life from an armed and angry mob of seamen that had marched
to London.75 Such rioting was more than an inconvenience - to many in the elite
it threatened what they saw as the proper order and very structure of society. The
Zeeland States deputy Michiel Michielzon waxed lyrical on a 'putrid gang of
sailors' who interrupted a meeting of the Zeeland States in 1676 - demanding
their wages with threats of violence. For Michielzon, their behaviour was evidence
that 'the mob gradually becomes more and more the boss'.76 Yet it was not only the
seamen's reaction to wage arrears that threatened the established order of things:
Dutch basic naval wage rates themselves were market-driven; this offered the sea
men some leverage over the authorities they tried to avoid service until wages
rose. In 1665, Johan de Witt complained
one day there must be something determined about keeping wages under an iron law, with
out that anyone can have some hope of a rise. Otherwise the seaman is the master and the
State left at the discretion of the mob.' 77
Whilst market forces and the consequent increased influence of 'the rabble' may
have been seen as a critical weakness in the wider social and political sense, we shall
see below that the resultant basic wages gave the Dutch an advantage over the
British.
Dutch finances particularly struggled to find money to pay wages during the
First Anglo-Dutch War. At Leghorn, Henry Appleton, the British commander,
was outnumbered two to one by the Dutch Mediterranean squadron.78 Appleton
thought he could reduce the odds against him: he knew that 200 English and
